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Abstract—Because robots can directly perceive and affect the
physical world, security issues take on particular importance.
In this paper, we describe the results of our work on scanning
the entire IPv4 address space of the Internet for instances of
the Robot Operating System (ROS), a widely used robotics
platform for research. Our results identified that a number of
hosts supporting ROS are exposed to the public Internet, thereby
allowing anyone to access robotic sensors and actuators. As
a proof of concept, and with consent, we were able to read
image sensor information and move the robot of a research
group in a US university. This paper gives an overview of
our findings, including the geographic distribution of publicly-
accessible platforms, the sorts of sensor and actuator data that is
available, as well as the different kinds of robots and sensors that
our scan uncovered. Additionally, we offer recommendations on
best practices to mitigate these security issues in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is particularly important in robotics platforms. A
robot can sense the physical world using sensors, or directly
change the physical world with its actuators. Thus, a robot can
leak sensitive information about its environment if accessed by
an unauthorized party, or even cause physical harm if operated
unsafely. Existing work has assessed the state of industrial
robot security and found a number of vulnerabilities [25, 33].
However, we are unaware of any studies that gauge the state
of security in robotics research.
To address this problem we conducted several scans of the
whole IPv4 address space, in order to identify unprotected
Robot Operating System (ROS) hosts [34], which are widely
used in robotics research. Like many research platforms, the
ROS designers made a conscious decision to exclude security
mechanisms because they did not have a clear model of
security threats and were not security experts themselves. The
ROS master node trusts all nodes that connect to it, and thus
should not be exposed to the public Internet. Nonetheless,
our scans identified over 100 publicly-accessible hosts that are
running a ROS master node. Of the nodes we found, a number
of them are connected to simulators, such as Gazebo [23],
while others appear to be real robots capable of being remotely
moved in ways dangerous both to the robot and the objects
around it. We present both a quantitative and qualitative
overview of our findings.
Quantitatively, we assessed the number of topics that appear
to be sensors and actuators of various types. We noticed a
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Fig. 1: Approximate locations (slightly jittered to show mul-
tiple points) of identified ROS masters across all scans. Red
indicates a host that showed evidence of publishing camera
information. Blue indicates a host that showed evidence of a
robot that could be actuated. Other hosts are in green.
roughly Zipfian distribution, with a few very common types,
but a long tail of one-off sensors and actuators. We also
observed that many robots seem to come online for a relatively
short period (hours or days) and then go offline again. They
are not generally left accessible for an extended period of time,
although we found some that were.
Qualitatively, we present case studies of several robots that
we found, in order to give a flavor of our results. We also
present a proof-of-concept takeover of one of the robots (with
the consent of the robot owner), in order to show that an open
ROS master indicates a robot whose sensors can be remotely
accessed, and whose actuators can be remotely controlled.
This scan was eye-opening for us as well. We found two of
our own robots as part of the scan, one Baxter [35] robot and
one drone. Neither was intentionally made available on the
public Internet, and both have the potential to cause physical
harm if used inappropriately.
Our goal is not to single out any researchers or robot plat-
forms, but to promote security as an important consideration—
not just in production systems, but in research settings as well.
Instead, our aim is to provide information about a concerning
situation and guidance about how the robotics community can
improve their security. Note that before the release of this
work, we have reached out to the owners of all affected robots
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and provided them with a summary of our findings.
II. RELATED WORK
Anecdotally, we are aware of a number of compromised
robots. As one example, we have been aware that Baxter [37]
robots contain a number of security problems: besides running
a ROS master on port 11311 (TCP), the robot also runs an
SSH server with a known default username and password [37]
that cannot be changed by the owner [1]. While the SSH
account does not directly give administrative access, it is still a
significant security risk, as it can be used as a stepping stone in
a multistage attack. That said, we are unaware of any specific
Baxters that were compromised as a result of this issue.
OSRF is developing a set of security enhancement to ROS,
termed Secure Robot Operating System (SROS) [46]. As of the
current writing, its website declares that this effort is “highly
experimental and must not be considered production-grade.” It
includes TLS [12] support for all socket transport within ROS,
certificates for chains of trust, as well as namespace and node
restrictions. This effort would certainly mitigate the security
issues we have discovered; e.g. a properly configured chain of
trust would only allow authorized nodes to publish commands
to topics that cause the robot to move. However, given the
current state of the software, it is not yet in wide use. Dieber
et al. [11] propose a new architecture for an authentication and
authorization services that can limit access to ROS services.
Additionally, we suspect that a more systemic solution should
be deployed in addition to these methods: the port 11311
should be filtered, by most hosts, rather than configuring a
complicated authentication/authorization infrastructure.
Rosbridge [8] provides a WebSocket interface to ROS and
a server to allow web applications interact with ROS nodes.
Rosbridge is often used as part of Robot Web Tools [48] to
make robots accessible from the Internet. To facilitate this,
Rosbridge provides TLS support for WebSocket connections,
access control(s) to limit the topics available to clients, and an
authorization mechanism to restrict API calls [48]. Unfortu-
nately, all these features are optional and disabled by default.
Denning et al. [10] studied the security and privacy risks of
home robots. They investigated three specific household robots
in 2008, uncovered a number of vulnerabilities, and surveyed
implications for the future. McClean et al. [26] provide an
overview of various security vulnerabilities, discovered in
ROS, after setting up a honeypot at DEFFCON-20 (2012).
They report several issues, including plaintext communica-
tions, unprotected TCP ports, and unencrypted data storage.
Cerrudo and Apa [5] identified vulnerabilities in several home
and research robotics platforms in 2017, demonstrating weak
or non-existent authentication procedures that allow an at-
tacker to control robots, perform firmware updates, or gain
access to sensor data. Our contribution is to identify instances
of of likely-exploitable configurations on the public Internet.
Quarta et al. [33] and Maggi et al. [25] conduct a security
assessment on an industrial robot controller, combined with
a practical exploit of an arm. They surveyed domain experts
from both academia and industry, and found that 30% had
robots accessible from the Internet, while 76% had never
performed a professional cybersecurity assessment. They also
used public Internet search engines, like Shodan and Zoom-
Eye, to look for FTP servers matching industrial devices,
identifying 28 robots and thousands of “industrial routers”
that enable remote access to devices. Our results, instead
quantitatively assess the number of ROS robots we found
accessible to the public Internet.
The Shodan search engine [43] continually scans the In-
ternet for services on a number of ports, and allows public
searches of the results. Examples of ports scanned by Shodan
include webserver ports (80, 443, 8080), FTP (21), SSH (22),
and Telnet (23). It does not currently report scans for the
default ROS master port: i.e. TCP port 11311.
III. ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM (ROS)
The Robot Operating System (ROS) [34] was introduced
by Willow Garage in 2007. ROS operates as a publish-
subscribe service to distribute data among nodes in a system.
A central master service is responsible for tracking published
and subscribed topics and provides a parameter server for
nodes to store various metadata. Nodes can publish data as
topics by advertising to the ROS master service. Other nodes
can subscribe to these topics by querying the master, which
provides the IP address and TCP port number of any nodes
publishing a given topic, allowing the subscriber to contact the
publishers directly to establish further connections.
ROS has a distributed architecture: nodes may run on
the same machine as the master, or on different machines.
The ROS master API is implemented using the XML-RPC
protocol, which is built over HTTP, and typically listens on
TCP port 11311 [39]. Each node runs its own slave XML-
RPC server that allows the node to advertise the topics it
publishes other nodes, update parameters, get the topics the
node publishes and subscribes to, and receive parameter and
publisher updates from the ROS master [40].
When subscribing to a topic, a client first asks the ROS
master for all nodes that publish the topic. Then, it connects
to each node’s XML-RPC server running the slave API and
calls a method to negotiate a connection. This method tells the
publishing node to open a TCP port for the subscriber node
to connect to and “speak” the TCPROS protocol. Note that all
of this communication is handled internally by the ROS client
libraries (most often, roscpp or rospy).
IV. IDENTIFYING ROBOTS USING ROS
We searched for ROS masters connected to the IPv4 Internet
address space by performing a scan of all public addresses
(roughly 3.7 billion IPs) on TCP port 11311, the default ROS
master port. Our scans were performed using ZMap [13], a
research tool for performing Internet-wide port scans. Port
scans operate by asynchronously sending probe packets (TCP
SYN) to a set of addresses to gather information about the
hosts that respond.
While port scans are very common on the public Internet,
conducting Internet-wide scans poses some inherent risks.
First, and foremost, the volume of traffic sent by a scan could
overwhelm destination networks. For this reason, we chose
ZMap as our scan apparatus, because it selects addresses to
scan using a pseudorandom permutation, rather than probing
all addresses in sequential order, to greatly reduce the number
of packets sent to a network at one time. Second, sending ROS
commands to unknown hosts also has the potential to cause
disruption: e.g., if the host is running a service other than
a ROS master on port 11311. When designing our scanning
framework, we made efforts to minimize potential disruptions
by using a series of minimally-invasive probes to confirm
the presence of a ROS master before sending commands.
Specifically, our scans were conducted in four stages, each
run on successively fewer hosts:
1) A TCP SYN scan to identify hosts accepting connec-
tions on the ROS master port (TCP 11311).
2) A TCP SYN scan on a high-numbered, normally-closed
port (e.g. 58243), to rule out addresses that may respond
on any port to deter scanning [28].
3) An HTTP GET / request on the ROS master port.
XML-RPC servers, including the ROS master, utilize
HTTP and respond to this request with a specific error
code, ruling out other services.
4) A series of passive ROS commands to collect host
information.
We also performed a scan for Rosbridge instances, which
run on TCP port 9090 and communicate using a JSON-based
WebSocket protocol. The scanning process for Rosbridge
followed similar stages, with the exception of using a different
test in stage 3 to identify WebSocket-capable HTTP servers
before sending ROS commands.
Critically, sending commands to active robots may pose a
safety hazard. We selected a minimal set of passive commands
designed to confirm that the host was in fact running ROS,
and gather data on the topics and parameters available on
each ROS instance. At no time did we attempt to modify
the state of the ROS master, or connect to any nodes, with
the exception of the experiments discussed in Section VI,
which were performed with express permission from the
robot’s operators. Specifically, we called getSystemState
to retrieve the list of publishers, subscribers, and services,
and called getParamNames to get the list of all named
parameters (but not their value). Additionally, we retrieved
the value of the parameter indicating the ROS version, as well
as the robot_description parameter which returns the
URDF (Unified Robot Description Format) if present [41].
Our scans were conducted from a host located on our
(university campus) network. Each scan was performed over a
period of 7 weekdays, to ensure a low rate of probe traffic
at destination networks. In accordance with a set of best
practices outlined by the ZMap authors [13], we made efforts
to provide information to any users observing our scan traffic.
This included publishing a web page on our scanning host
(public) IP address, with a description of the scan and a
contact email address for more information or to request
TABLE I: Identified ROS versions.
ROS
Version Distro Master 1 Master 2 Master 3 Rosbridge
1.10.x Hydro 2 1 2 0
1.11.x Indigo/Jade 60 56 44 4
1.12.x Kinetic 78 61 53 10
1.13.x Lunar 4 4 3 1
TABLE II: Scan results summary.
Category Master 1 Master 2 Master 3 Rosbridge
Identified robots 19 13 12 4
Simulation only 37 32 21 2
Empty ROS cores 37 29 26 0
Only sensors 24 28 18 2
Only actuators 2 1 3 0
Only identified services 11 8 12 6
Unclassified 14 11 10 1
Total ROS Instances 144 122 102 15
removal from further scans. (Note that over the course of our
scanning period, we received only one automated request to
cease probing an organization’s network, and complied with
the request.) We also added a host that listens on TCP port
11311 and logs any connections to it; the only connection we
observed was from our own scan. Thus, we have not observed
any evidence that anyone else is (yet) scanning on port 11311
to identify publicly-accessible robots, even though, with only
one server listening, this is far from conclusive.
V. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
We conducted three scans on the ROS master port between
December 2017 and January 2018. We refer to these scans
as Master 1–3, respectively. Each ROS master scan observed
over 100 ROS instances, spanning 28 countries, with over
70% of the observed instances using addresses belonging
to various university networks or research institutions. We
performed one scan for Rosbridge instances in November 2017
and identified 15 total instances, with 11 instances located in
networks recognizable as cloud service providers.
Table I shows the distribution of ROS versions for the
three scans, based on the ros_comm version returned by
each instance. Almost all hosts were running either Indigo,
Jade, or Kinetic. Table II provides a summary of our results,
organized into types based on their topic data. We define a
simulator to be a host that showed evidence of one of the
robot simulator topics listed in Section V-D. We define a robot
as a host that shows evidence of a sensor and an actuator,
but is not a simulator. Each type is mutually exclusive, so
identified sensors, actuators, and robots, in this table, did not
show evidence of being a simulator. These results must be
taken as approximate, since we did not actually subscribe to
any of the topics, consider their type, or verify connectivity
with real hardware. However, given the standardization of
topic names, it seems likely that many of the hosts we found
were indeed running sensors, actuators, and other software.
Empty ROS cores showed only the base rosout topics and
services. Some of these hosts additionally had parameters set
(perhaps indicating some nodes had been running previously,
and later shut down). Unclassified nodes did not fit into any
of our other categories.
We do not combine the results of each scan to form a “grand
total” for each type, as many hosts appeared in more than one
scan and returned different topic data each time. We discuss
these observations in more detail in Section V-F.
Table III shows the number of hosts for every type of sensor,
actuator, and service, for each scan. Each host may appear in
more than one row of this table, for example, if it contained
evidence of a camera, an IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit), or
a joystick. We separate results into hosts that showed evidence
of being a simulator vs. all others. This way, we can separate
hosts that showed evidence of exposing physical sensors
compared to hosts that are likely only exposing simulated
sensors and actuators. We inferred information about robots
from the robot_description parameter, as well as some
canonical topic names. The most common type of robot in
our search was the Turtlebot [18]. We also found Baxter
robots [35], WAM arms [3], the Da Vinci research kit [22],
drones, vehicles, and one flying insect.
A. Identifying topics
We classified the number of sensors and actuators in dif-
ferent categories. Because we wanted to limit the load we
placed on discovered host, we only retrieved the names of
topics, but not their type. While this fact does limit our
knowledge, because we cannot search, for example, for all
sensor_msgs::Image topics, we can still obtain substan-
tial evidence from the topic names. We did not subscribe or
publish to any topics, because we did not want to view any
sensor data or actuate any robots without permission. As a
result, we cannot state with certainty whether we have found
active sensors or actuators. However, the list of topics provides
evidence of what is likely to be available to an attacker.
With the obtained data in a local database, we constructed
queries for various topics of interest in robotics, and divide our
results into sensors and actuators. We also looked for common
libraries, and evidence of use of simulators. In constructing
queries, we manually examined the topic list in order to
identify topics that map to different sensors/actuators. As we
found indicators, we added these to the list of queries run on all
data to classify the object. We describe the queries below; the
complete list can be found in our supplementary attachment.
B. Sensors
Sensors found in our scan included cameras, laser range
finders, barometric pressure sensors, GPS devices, tactile
sensors, and compasses. While camera topics appear to
have the most standardization in terms of topic names
(e.g.camera_info or image), we found other viable search
terms as well. More specifically: (a) Cameras: we searched for
a number of standard camera sensors, as well as for depth cam-
eras, by looking for depth_registered. (b) LIDAR: we
searched for velodyne and point_cloud. (c) Barometric
Pressure Sensors: we found barometric pressure sensors that
appear to be used to sense height in drones; the search term
baro was used to identify these devices. (d) Tactile Sensors:
we found evidence of a specific tactile sensor, the BioTac sen-
sor, using the topic biotac. (e) Compass Sensors: we found
several hosts that appeared to have compasses, by using the
topic compass. (f) Odometry: we found odometry sensors,
which had the fairly standard name odom or odometry.
(g) Joystick and Keyboard: we searched for topics with the
name joy or joystick for evidence. (h) Microphone: we
searched for the topic microphone to identify audio sensors.
C. Actuators
Actuator topic names are much more eclectic. We found
some standardization in topics for moving joints, but the ma-
jority of the topic names we observed, in this case, were one-
off. In particular: (a) Arms: we found a number of standard
topics that seemed to indicate an arm that moves, includ-
ing joint_trajectory, trajectory_controller,
and action_controller. (b) Grippers: many robots that
had grippers used gripper as a topic name. (c) Playing
Sound: we found evidence that the sound_play library
was used to play sounds on several hosts, and, hence we
used that topic to identify sound actuators. (d) Heartbeat:
a heartbeat is an indicator that an actuator is involved be-
cause it is important to have a heartbeat if the robot can
move and therefore potentially hurt someone; we searched
for the topic name heartbeat. (e) One-Off: we found a
number of one-off actuator topics; for one manipulator robot,
the topic MotorCommand seemed to indicate an actuator;
for a drone, the topic inceptor_command seemed likely
to refer to a topic that sends flight commands; the topic
flystate2phidgetsanalog seems to send voltages for
controlling a faux-fruit fly [16].
D. Simulators
We also found many ROS instances that appeared to be
connected to simulated robots. The most obvious were con-
nected to the Gazebo simulator [23]. We also found groups that
appeared to be using the Unity Game Engine [14], the game
TORCS [17], and the Stage simulator [20]. We considered any
topics with gazebo, unity, or torcs_ros to be evidence
of using one of these simulators. Additionally, if the host had
the parameter use_sim_time or fake, indicating use of
simulated inputs, we considered it to be a simulator as well.
Running a simulator with an open ROS master does not
pose the same physical risk as a real robot. However, given
the complexity of a ROS system, and the ability to connect to
other nodes, in many programming languages, it seems likely
that this configuration still poses a threat: the machine can
be compromised through a remote exploit, such as a buffer
overrun in a ROS node.
E. Common Libraries
We also report evidence of use of the most common
libraries, including MoveIt! [7], Gazebo [23] and others.
TABLE III: Topic and parameter search results.
Category Parameter Master 1 Master 2 Master 3 Rosbridge
Sensors
Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log
Camera 29 22 29 11 22 11 5 1
Camera + Depth 13 15 13 6 9 8 2 1
Camera + RGB 12 7 6 5 9 5 1 1
Camera + Stereo 1 3 1 4 3
Kinect 3 2 3 2 2 2
IMU 14 16 9 16 6 11 2
Gyro
Lidar 12 13 5 9 2 11 3 2
Motion Capture 4 2 3 1
Compass 3 2 1
Odometry 8 12 6 14 5 11 3 2
Pressure 1 3 1 2 1 1
Contact 4 3 2 3 2 4
biotac 1
Velodyne 4 5 4 2 3 1
point_cloud 1 4 1 3 1 1
Force 1
Radar 1 2 1 1 1 1
Geolocation 4 9 6 8 3 3
Audio 1
Temperature 2 2 1 1
Battery Monitor 4 3 3 2 2 1 5
Printhead status 1
Joystick 5 2 3 9 2 3 3
Actuators
Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log
Movable base 11 12 8 13 9 9 4 2
Servo 1 1 2
Lights 1 12 1 9 1 6
Arm 4 6 7 2 3 1
Gripper 4 3 1 5 2 2 1
Flippers 5
Sound 1 1 2
Heartbeat 2 1 1
Voice 3
MotorCommand 1
inceptor_command 1 1 1
flystate2phidgetsanalog 1 1
Emergency Stop 2 2 1
Printhead 1
Simulators
Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log
Gazebo 19 18 15 1
Unity 1 1
Stageros 1 2 1 1
torcs_ros 1
Dreamview 2 1 1
Playback 3 2
Robot Types
Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log
Baxter 1 1 1
PR2 2 3 2
WAM 1 1 1
JACO 1
Turtlebot 1 1
DaVinci 1
Libraries
Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log Phys. HW Sim./Log
Rosbridge 7 3 8 3 9 2 12 2
RViz 27 15 19 7 15 1
MoveIt! 1 4 2 1
OpenRAVE 1 1 1
Transform Library (tf) 39 28 32 17 26 15 4 2
Fiducial Libraries 1 2 1 2 1
ROS Tutorials 1 1 1
master_discovery 2 3 2 1
master_sync 2 3 2 1
robot_position 1 1
robot_position 1 1
web_video_server 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
a) Rosbridge: Rosbridge [8] provides a JSON-based
interface to ROS using WebSockets, allowing client libraries
to interface with ROS from a single connection. We searched
for rosbridge to identify hosts running this node.
b) MoveIt!: MoveIt! [7] is a library that performs motion
planning primarily for robot arms. We searched for the topic
move_group for evidence that this library was being run. We
identified many MoveIt! instances that were not connected to
real robots, but some were indeed connected to real arms.
c) Fiducial Libraries: It is common to use fiducial
marker libraries, such as AprilTags [31] or AR Tags [15],
to mark objects in the robot’s environment. We searched for
hosts using these libraries with the topics apriltag and
ar_track_alvar.
F. Persistent Hosts vs. Temporary Hosts
We hypothesized that many ROS instances are not always
online, and instead are only available (and visible to our scans)
during intermittent periods of usage. Since our scans took
place over a period of 7 days, intermittent hosts may not
have been detected, if they were not available at the time
their IP address was scanned. Conversely, a host may have
been detected multiple times, in a single scan, if its IP address
changed during the scan period. We examined our results to
find hosts that appeared in multiple scans and those appearing
in only one scan. Comparing, however, host responses between
scans is non-trivial. A single ROS instance may use different
IP addresses, or DNS names, over time due to dynamic
IP allocations (via DHCP) or physical movement between
networks, and may provide different topic and parameter data
based on the host’s usage at the time of scanning.
We were able to match a number of hosts between scans
using their local machine hostnames, which are included in
the names of parameters added to the parameter server when
starting a ROS instance or launching a node. For example, the
parameter /roslaunch/uris/host_potato__46636
refers to a physical machine named “potato.” Although a
host may contain multiple roslaunch parameters, if nodes
are run from other machines, we found that 90% of the
hosts scanned contained a single machine hostname When a
machine name was not available, we also considered hosts
with the same IP addresses as matches, if they contained
a percentage of similar topics. We acknowledge that using
machine hostnames to uniquely identify hosts is not definitive:
e.g. two hosts may share the same machine name, perhaps
if their operating systems were from a cloned image; we
observed 5 instances of a machine name appearing more than
once, in a single scan, which either indicates two hosts with
the same machine name, or one host using different IPs.
Using these empirical methods, we found that 41 hosts were
present in all three ROS master scans, 48 hosts were found in
two scans, with the remaining hosts only observed once. Of the
hosts that were matched between scans, 25 hosts were grouped
into different categories (cf. Table II) based on their topic
data at the time each scan was performed. This demonstrates
how a single ROS instance may have different usage patterns
over time, depending on the experiments being performed
by the user. While this poses a challenge to classification,
it also highlights a further privacy risk, as the topic data
made available by an open ROS instance can demonstrate a
researcher’s usage patterns. To provide one example, we found
one machine name that appeared three different times in the
scan with three distinct IPs: one IP with a DNS name of a
research lab at a university, which showed topics indicating
a simulator; one IP mapped to another network in the same
university, which also displayed simulator topics; and another
IP that mapped to a consumer ISP located near the university,
which displayed no topics, indicating the ROS core was empty.
VI. CASE STUDIES
We present a few case studies of specific hosts we discov-
ered, to give a sense of the nature of robots we found, and the
potential damage that could occur if they were compromised.
A. Flying Insect
We found what appears to be a tethered winged insect. This
system appears to be running the Kinefly node [16], which
extracts kinematic variables from a living insect including
the head, abdomen, left wing and right wing. The goal is
to provide a real-time estimate of the fly’s position and
orientation, in order to study fruit flies and other insects [2].
Kinefly appears to send voltages to servos that move a magnet,
which causes the dummy fly to move. It seems unlikely that
by moving this robot we could have hurt anyone, due to its
small size. However, we could have certainty disrupted any
ongoing experiment, and possibly harmed the real fruit flies
interacting with the robot fly.
B. Baxter
We found one Baxter robots in our scan, which belonged
to the authors. We had set up the robot behind a router
with NAT [45] configured. However, we wanted to enable
remote access as part of our research, and hence we configured
the router to forward TCP port 11311 to the internal Baxter
machine. However, we did not disable NAT traversal past the
end of our research project, and, therefore, our robot was
publicly-accessible for several months.
We took advantage of this opportunity to perform a pen test
on our own robot. We were able to run XML-RPC calls on
the ROS master to obtain listed topics and nodes, as well as
modify parameter (rosparam) values. This access allows us
to put the robot in a dangerous state by changing the gains on
the PID controller for Baxter’s arm—incorrectly tuned PIDs
could cause the arm to oscillate unexpectedly. We were unable
to subscribe to topics on this robot as it was located behind a
NAT, which blocks incoming connections. A subscriber must
connect to two other TCP ports, when subscribing to a topic
(one for the XML-RPC server, and one for the TCPROS
connection), and because these ports were not forwarded
through the NAT, we could not establish a connection. Luckily,
we were unable to view sensor information from the camera,
or images, from a computer outside our network.
However, because subscribers connect to publishers, we
were able to publish topics from our remote machine. We
verified that we could change the image on the robot’s face
by publishing a message, as well as publish joint angles.
Potentially, we could have disabled safe mode on the robot
by publishing to a topic at a high rate, as described by the
Baxter SDK [36]. Certainly this access would put operators
of the robot at risk, since an attacker could move the robot
unexpectedly, as well as change parameters to put the robot
in a dangerous state, despite not having access to sensor data.
C. Mobile-Manipulator
One robot found in our scan was the mobile manipulator
robot Herb2, at the University of Washington. This robot was
running topics that indicated the presence of a multisense
RGB-D sensor, a node that appears to perform speech pro-
duction/generation, as well as a service for moving its neck.
The robot also had parameters indicating the presence of
controllers for arms, but the arm nodes did not appear to be
running at the time of our scan.
After contacting the robot’s operators, we coordinated with
them to perform a penetration test on it. They informed us
that the robot was publicly-accessible during the period of
our scan, because it coincided with a critical demonstration.
We set the ROS_MASTER_URI environment variable (of
our local ROS node/host) to the URL of the robot, and
ROS_IP to the IPv4 address of our host. Note that for two-
way communication, all nodes in ROS must be able to connect
to servers on all other nodes—the ROS master dynamically
assigns a (unique) port to each publisher. Thus, our host
had to be publicly-accessible. The next problem was that
the ROS_HOSTNAME variable, of the nodes in the robot’s
network, was set to the (local) name herb2, instead of
the fully qualified domain name. We fixed this problem by
adding herb2 to our local /etc/hosts file with the correct
(remote) IP address. This fix required no changes to the robot
or extra information from the remote site.
At this point we were able to use the camera of the ROS
master, as shown in Figure 2. We could view images at 1.5Hz.
Note that camera feed can be obtained without the knowledge,
or consent, of the robot owner or operator (although we did
have knowledge and consent in this case), potentially violating
the privacy of people working with the robot. Additionally,
an attacker could perform reconnaissance by viewing sensor
information: e.g. run a face tracker or a movement sensor on
the images, in order to determine dangerous times to move the
robot. We were also able to view joint angles, obtained from
the TF tree, as well as a 3D point cloud, visible in Figure 2c.
We tried to actuate the robot by playing sounds and
moving its neck. The robot had a service for performing
speech synthesis, and the lab had released the code for that
service on GitHub [32]. As a result, we were able to play
sounds on the robot by installing and building this package,
and writing a rospy script to send the action. Many ROS
topics and services have standard names and types, like
ros_control [38], which could be accessed in this way.
(a) UW’s Robot. (b) Image obtained from the robot’s camera.
(c) View from RVIZ showing 3D point cloud and TF tree.
Fig. 2: Images obtained from the robot’s camera.
Finally, we tried to move the robot. The robot had a
service available for moving its neck. However this service
was developed specifically for this hardware and not released
publicly by the lab. As a result, although we could see that
the service existed, we did not know the format of the srv
file (i.e. the file used by ROS for describing service types)
to specify correct calls. ROS does not allow a service call
unless the MD5 checksum of the srv (or msg, action)
file matches between the two nodes. Additionally, it does not
display information about the differences between the two files
when the MD5 checksum fails.
MD5 is not a (cryptographically) secure hash [6], but it
can be used to verify data integrity. It may be possible to
reconstruct the srv (or msg) file from the provided MD5
hash that is printed when the initial attempt fails, and partial
knowledge of the format. We decided to leave the investigation
for this reconstruction for the future. Instead, we asked the
lab to provide only the srv file used for the service to
move the neck. We then constructed a ROS package to build
the interface to the service and used rosservice to call
it and successfully actuate the neck. (The video attachment
documents our penetration effort, with both a screen capture
from the remote attacking computer as well as a video from
the scene with the robot.) Notably, the lab informed us that
we could have damaged the robot by actuating the neck to
certain out-of-bounds values. A pan/tilt camera arm probably
would not injure a person unless their hands happened to be
at a pinch point.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED SECURITY
We have contacted the owner(s) of the hosts identified as
ROS instances to notify them of our findings and provide
recommendation for how users can fix their security.
Detecting exposure: At minimum, we recommend that users
inspect their network exposure using tools such as nmap [24]
and nc [29]. A command such as nmap 192.168.1.10
-p 11311 (changing the address accordingly) will scan an
address, or range of addresses, for open ROS master ports.
To correctly interpret results, it is important to consider the
network’s structure and any existing security mechanisms: e.g.
performing the scan from another host on the same organi-
zational network may yield different results than an outside
network. We advise researchers to consult any organizational
policies associated with conducting scans, and potentially
coordinate with their network administrators, before scanning
a wide range of addresses.
Firewall: One way to secure ROS instances against unautho-
rized access is to use a firewall to prevent exposure of ROS
services to the public Internet. We recommend that ROS users
define a trust zone on a network where ROS traffic is permitted
to perform tasks, and take steps to restrict network access to
ROS hosts outside this segment.
A common—but insufficient—practice to create a small
private network is to use a common wireless router, or
other device, to provide Internet access to a private address
range (e.g. 192.168.*.*) using NAT. By design, NAT blocks
incoming traffic that does not pertain to a connection initiated
by a host on the internal network, mimicking the operation
of a firewall. Indeed, a ROS host behind NAT would not
have been visible to our scans, unless it explicitly contained
a rule to forward traffic to port 11311. However, using NAT
alone does not provide a comprehensive solution to prevent
exposure of ROS traffic to the Internet. In general, NAT is
not a security apparatus: an internal host that makes external
connections can still leak data, and NAT implementations can
be misconfigured or, in some cases, exploited to open ports for
outside access [4, 9, 19]. As one example, our Baxter robot
was found in our scan results because the ROS master port
for its lab was forwarded to its address.
While NAT provides a first step to blocking external traffic,
we recommend using a more complete firewall solution, pos-
sibly in coordination with existing IT services. At minimum,
traffic on the ROS master port should not be permitted from
outside hosts. ROS traffic on other services is difficult to block,
since port numbers are allocated dynamically by the ROS
master—an application-specific, stateful firewall can, however,
be helpful in this case. For client machines using ROS, we
suggest using an OS-level firewall (e.g., Netfilter [30]) to re-
strict incoming traffic on all ports except for trusted networks.
This is especially important for ROS users on laptops, or other
mobile machines, which may operate from both trusted and
untrusted networks.
In some cases, it may be necessary for a robot to be operated
outside a trusted network. It was for this reason that our
Baxter was exposed to the Internet: we had the explicit goal
to operate it from an off-site location. In such cases, a firewall
provides a (far) more robust solution than NAT, as it can
restrict access based on explicit policies (i.e. allow/deny access
from/to specifically-defined hosts or networks).
Isolation: An alternative, but less flexible, solution could
involve placing ROS hosts on an isolated network, without
access to the Internet, which eliminates the challenge of con-
figuring firewall policies. To permit certain traffic, an HTTP
proxy (e.g. Squid [44]) can relay traffic for web browsing and
critical OS updates.
VPN: Remote access can be provided using a virtual private
network (VPN): the VPN securely makes a remote host look
as if it is a local one, enabling the robot to be accessed
remotely. If available, a VPN provides a comprehensive way
to permit only authorized hosts to access a ROS master.
While considerably simpler to configure, SSH/SSL tunnels are
generally insufficient for granting remote access, since a ROS
master may direct a remote client to connect to many different
IP addresses or ports to send or receive topic data. VPNs are
considered the best practice for securing a ROS system by
the Open Source Robotics foundation and were configured on
every PR2 that shipped.
Rosbridge: Rosbridge is an alternative mechanism for in-
teracting with a ROS master that provides certain security
benefits. At minimum, Rosbridge acts as a proxy for the ROS
master API, to serve all traffic over a single port, simplifying
the challenge of making non-local connections. Rosbridge also
allows a user to specify a list of protected topics that will
not be served by the API. Further, it provides an optional
authorization mechanism using MACs to restrict API calls to
hosts that have obtained an authorization key from an external
server [47]. While this requires users to configure their own
authentication server, it provides a way to define flexible,
arbitrary policies for access control.
Future mechanisms: Further extensions to ROS, such as
SROS and (the emerging) ROS2 [42], may also help to miti-
gate this issue by more tightly integrating security mechanisms
into the robot architecture. Notably, ROS2’s adoption of a mid-
dleware interface for data exchange may offer a flexible way
to build appropriate defenses for a given application. Longer-
term, it is important to think about security concerns in any
network, especially those running ROS. We urge researchers
using ROS to consider how the network is utilized in their
environment and take steps to protect their infrastructure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though a few unsecured robots might not seem like a criti-
cal issue, our study has shown that a number of research robots
is accessible and controllable from the public Internet. It is
likely these robots can be remotely actuated in ways dangerous
to both the robot and the human operators. Additionally, the
robot’s sensors can be viewed, which is a threat to privacy.
Remote actuation has also the ability to allow an attacker to
inject subtle bugs or strange behavior into the robot.
It is important to develop mechanisms for enabling us to
use these powerful tools while also securing them so that
they cannot be accessed by bad actors. In the future, we hope
that Shodan will scan port 11311 to aid in identifying open
robots so that we can protect them. We also hope that more
robosticists will be aware of the security issues involved as a
result of our work, and take steps to prevent their robots from
being publicly-accessible.
Additionally, we are eager to explore other popular plat-
forms, such as YARP [27] and LCM [21]. These scans
may identify additional robots that should be monitored for
intrusion and additional vulnerabilities.
As robots move out of the lab and into industrial and
home settings, the number of units that could be subverted
is bound to increase manifold. Recent attacks on the Internet
infrastructure from home devices serve as a clear warning.
It will be even more important to provide adequate security
for devices that can change not just the virtual world, but the
physical world as well.
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